Restricting the Power to Formulate Subnational (Regional) Constitutions in Iraq

March 25, 2025

By Dr. Muhannad Faleh Hassan

The nature of the federal system has contributed to the formation of distinctive features of its sovereignty. If this system is a constitutional mechanism of governance, it entails a foundational duality that joins federal constitutions with non-federal constitutions (regional constitutions). Thus, the special character of constitutional sovereignty in Iraq’s federal system is confirmed: the will of the federal constituent authority supersedes that of the authority tasked with drawing up the regional constitutions, i.e., it restricts them within the bounds set by the federal constitution. This means the federal system is applied as intended by the federal constituent authority. Adopting the federal system has affected the constitutional structure of the state, since the principle of inherent independence for the federal units imposes constitutional duality within the state—a federal constitution governing the exercise of authority at the federal level, and regional constitutions that reflect the constitutional choices of the regions in line with their unique characteristics and interests. This necessitates restricting the powers to draft regional constitutions to ensure their compatibility with the constitutional origins and principles of the federal system. Yet achieving such compatibility remains theoretical unless the constitutional legislator determines specific consequences for cases where compatibility is absent; that is, unless it establishes a constitutional mechanism that rules on potential conflicts between the constitutional product of a regional constitution-making authority and the federal constitution, such that this mechanism serves as the ultimate limit to the power of that authority.